

SAPG-12848/R

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23 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Security Officer  
THROUGH : Project Director of Administration  
SUBJECT : Security Survey of RAINBOW Facilities at  
[REDACTED]

1. I have read this report and I am returning it herewith with my concurrence. I do wish, however, to elaborate on the recommendation therein contained.

2. My feeling is that the best if not the only way to maintain security about many activities connected with the RAINBOW program is to allow them to seem to be normal, unclassified activities rather than to protect them with physical security controls. The reason I am led to this view is that, especially in view of the history of the Project, it is simply impossible physically to conceal, or to prevent the access of unauthorized persons to, locations and production operations.

3. I feel we have deliberately and carefully taken this approach with respect to the application of RAINBOW materials to the aircraft. In [REDACTED] I believe we should take the same approach. It seems to me entirely feasible, since it is not unusual for the [REDACTED] to be coating various types of paper or other bases with mixtures employing commercial solvents and requiring heat treatment. This fortunate circumstance makes it highly unlikely that unauthorized personnel who enter the production facility will see anything (except perhaps test equipment) which will either seem unusual or suggest the true nature and purpose of the operation. In the case of the electronics equipment, I feel we will be very well advised to have a very simple, brief cover story to explain its presence.

4. The great danger that concerns me in [REDACTED] is not what unauthorized persons will see but what they will hear. It is terribly easy for a group of men who are working together day after day to fall into the

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25X1A6a habit of talking about their work in a manner highly compromising if  
25X1A6a continued in the presence of unauthorized personnel. Although the people  
concerned in [REDACTED] are almost surely too careful to fall into this  
simple error, I am convinced that they have allowed a number of unauthor-  
ized people who are frequent visitors to the [REDACTED] gradually to learn the  
true nature of the activity. I hope we have by now caught up with and  
briefed all of these people but the danger remains of similar piecemeal  
and gradual compromise.

25X1A6a 5. I would suggest, therefore, that the first tightening of  
25X1A6a security that should be imposed in [REDACTED] is a careful indoctrination  
of personnel with frequent access to the [REDACTED] concerning their conversa-  
tion when any unauthorized individuals are present.

25X1A5a1 6. As to the control of physical access to the area, I wonder if  
this could not be done more unobtrusively by posting a list of authorized  
personnel than by attempting to institute a system of badges or other  
arrangements which would arouse curiosity in [REDACTED]

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.  
Project Director

Attachment:

Copy 1, SAPC-12861/R

RMB:gjg (22 July 57)

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